Another Dissimilarity between Moral Virtue and Skills: An Interpretation of Nicomachean Ethics II 4 by Echenique, Javier
199© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018 
M. D. Boeri et al. (eds.), Soul and Mind in Greek Thought. Psychological Issues 
in Plato and Aristotle, Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind 20, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78547-9_10
Chapter 10
Another Dissimilarity between Moral 
Virtue and Skills: An Interpretation 
of Nicomachean Ethics II 4
Javier Echeñique
Abstract In Nicomachean Ethics II 4 Aristotle famously raises a puzzle concern-
ing moral habituation, and he seems to dissolve it by recourse to the analogy 
between moral virtue and skills. A new interpretation of the chapter is offered on the 
basis of an important evaluative dissimilarity then noted by Aristotle, one almost 
universally disregarded by interpreters of the chapter. I elucidate the nature of the 
dissimilarity in question and argue for its paramount importance for understanding 
Aristotle’s conception of moral agency. I also show that it is the particularly intri-
cate and puzzling character of the chapter that has prevented scholars from noticing 
such a dissimilarity and from integrating it to the interpretation of the chapter.
10.1  Introduction
Since the dawn of moral speculation the analogy between moral virtue and skills 
(τέχναι) has been profusely employed by moral philosophers such as the early Plato 
and the Stoics, to elucidate and provide support to their respective conceptions of 
moral virtue – conceptions about its very nature and its causal relationship with 
human happiness. The analogy is still considered by some contemporary philoso-
phers, such as Julia Annas, as shedding light upon various aspects of moral virtue, 
such as its development, or the practical reasoning of the virtuous person.1
As is well known, in various junctures of his ethical wittings Aristotle cautions 
against taking too far the comparison between moral virtues and skills. He main-
tains that, whereas systematic knowledge and capacities in general (including 
skills), can be used for either of two contrary ends – a doctor can, in virtue of the 
very same knowledge, both cure and kill  – virtues of character are dispositions: 
1 For Annas’ skill-based account of virtue, see Annas (2011).
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when we possess them we are said to be practically and affectively disposed in a 
particular way, i.e. well, not badly (EN 1129a11–17). And even more significantly, 
whereas skills are concerned with production – which has an end beyond itself, the 
finished product – virtues of character are concerned with a different sort of thing 
altogether: πρᾶξις, conduct  – which does not have an end beyond itself (EN 
1140a1-b25).
There is, nonetheless, another aspect of the analogy that Aristotle deemed par-
ticularly misleading. As we shall see, the virtue-skill parallel raises the following 
question: if, as Aristotle undoubtedly recognises, full health or a clean victory can 
come about by chance as well as by the productive agency of the art of medicine or 
athletic skills, why not say that a fully good outcome, from the moral point of view, 
can come about by chance as well – i.e. independently of moral agency? But if a 
fully good outcome from the moral point of view can indeed come about by chance, 
or by any other means outside the agency of moral virtue, then such an outcome 
cannot possibly derive any portion of its total goodness from its being ‘produced’ 
by moral agency, when it is in fact so produced. In other words, the moral virtue- 
skill parallel suggests that the value of acting from moral virtue (i.e. moral agency) 
is in itself null, or at least non-intrinsic and purely derivative. For – if we continue 
with the parallel – we might think of the goodness of moral virtue as one that merely 
derives from its capacity – when possessed by an agent as a disposition – to be a 
reliable producer of such a ‘fully good moral outcome’. On this picture that 
ultimately results from the parallel, voluntariness and the further conditions of 
acting from virtue (i.e. the conditions of moral agency) that Aristotle recognises 
(such as acting from rational choice, for the sake of the act itself, and from a firm 
moral character) derive their significance merely from their being ‘causally linked’ 
in a peculiarly strong sense to a morally good outcome which – just like a clean 
victory or full health – has been already established as good quite independently of 
moral agency. On this parallel between moral virtue and skills, acting from moral 
virtue ends up having the sort of value that consequentialist accounts attribute to 
moral virtue.
It is of the utmost importance, accordingly, to see that in Ethica Nicomachea II 
4, as I will attempt to show, Aristotle firmly opposes this consequentialist concep-
tion of the value of acting from moral virtue  – and also to see why he does so. 
Aristotle notes in this chapter a crucial dissimilarity between moral virtue and 
skills – one that allows him to reject a consequentialist account of the value of moral 
agency. The dissimilarity in question consists in establishing the intrinsic goodness 
of virtuous character and moral agency, and the purely extrinsic and derivative one 
pertaining to proficient, skilled agency. Acting from moral virtue, in other words, 
enhances the goodness of the ‘moral outcome’ – or it may well be its only source. 
Supporting this claim is the primary purpose of this article.
Nonetheless, I also want to show how unveiling this dissimilarity between moral 
virtue and skills contributes to the solution to the aporia about habituation raised in 
Nicomachean Ethics II 4, thus forming an integral part of that solution. For it is my 
suspicion that scholars’ failure to understand the complex nature of this solution has 
prevented them from recognising here the aforementioned evaluative dissimilarity 
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between moral virtue and skills.2 Accordingly, offering an interpretation of the apo-
ria about habituation and Aristotle’s strategy for dissolving it – in sum, an interpre-
tation of the bulk of Nicomachean Ethics II 4 – will be my secondary aim.
10.2  The Aporia about Habituation and its Initial Dissolution
In the first three chapters of Nicomachean Ethics II, Aristotle has been arguing that 
the moral virtues result from habituation. Even though we are naturally receptive of 
them, it is not by nature that we come to acquire them (as in the case of the senses), 
but rather by frequently behaving in ways characteristic of virtue whenever such 
behaviour is called for (and preferably, from our earliest youth). Furthermore, 
Aristotle has made an important claim that seems to be stronger than the habituation 
claim: virtue “is exercised in the same kinds of actions as those from which it comes 
about” (1105a15–16, cf. 1104a27-b3). For example, we become courageous by 
being habituated in enduring fearful things in the right way, and once we have 
become courageous, it is this same conduct of ‘enduring fearful things in the right 
way’ that we shall best be able to perform.
Also significant for our present purposes is to note that Aristotle has made use of 
the analogy with skills to provide support for the habituation claim and the identity 
claims: The habituation claim is also true of the acquisition of skills, perhaps a more 
conspicuous process which can serve accordingly to illustrate the more unclear case 
of moral habituation. Just as we become lyre-players by playing the lyre, or builders 
by building, so too we become just or moderate by performing just or moderate 
deeds (cf. 1103a31-b2, 1103b6–17). Further, Aristotle also illustrates the identity 
claim with the case of strength, which he treats in these contexts as a skill 
(1104a30–3).
Given that Aristotle has previously argued for the habituation claim and the iden-
tity claim – and in both cases partly on the basis of an analogy with skills – it is not 
surprising to see the philosopher confronted with an aporia in the first lines of 
Nicomachean Ethics II 4: ‘What do we mean by saying that in order to become just, 
men need to do just things (τὰ δίκαια), and in order to become moderate they need 
to do moderate things (τὰ σώφρονα)?’ (1105a17–19). In other words: How can the 
habituation claim be true? For it seems that to do just or moderate things implies 
that the agent carrying out these actions is already just or moderate (what I shall call 
the ‘act-sufficiency claim’). After all, according to the identity claim, both the 
actions leading to the acquisition of moral virtue and those through which an already 
2 And perhaps also from simply recognising the dissimilarity itself. A good example is Tom 
Angier’s recent book, where he does not even consider Nicomachean Ethics II 4 as containing an 
argument against the ‘evaluative’ assimilation of moral virtue to skills (see Angier (2010, 
pp.  41–49)). Some interpreters have even attributed to Aristotle some sort of consequentialist 
assimilation of virtuous agency to skills concerning the way they contribute to the value of their 
typical products. The most prominent example is Sauvé Meyer (2011, p. 47 and p. 162). Her view 
serves as an example of the sort of consequentialist view I have mentioned.
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acquired virtue is manifested, are the same. Aristotle of course has not yet explained 
what exactly he means by ‘the same’ in the identity claim, but it is reasonable to 
assume that the identity claim, thus vaguely formulated, motivates the act- sufficiency 
claim and thus renders problematic the thesis about moral habituation.
Nor is it surprising, in light of what has gone before, to see the philosopher 
encouraging the aporia about habituation by recourse to the analogy with skills 
(τέχναι). Indeed, the same problem arises for skills. How can one learn to be a 
grammarian or a musician by doing ‘grammatical things’ (τὰ γραμματικά) or by 
doing ‘musical things’ (τὰ μουσικά), if doing these ‘things’ implies (because of the 
parallel identity claim for skills, we might suppose) that the person doing them is 
already in possession of the skill of grammar or music? (cf. 1105a20–1).
Aristotle develops an intricate argument in order to solve the aporia about habit-
uation, which I have divided in three parts. His first maneuver is pretty straightfor-
ward. He claims that this supposed act-sufficiency implication of ‘doing F things’ 
fails to apply in the domain of skills:
[Τ1] It is possible to produce something grammatical (γραμματικόν τι ποῆσαι) both by 
chance and at someone else’s prompting. One will only count as literate, then, if one both 
does something grammatical and does it grammatically (γραμματικῶς); and this is what is 
done in accordance with one’s own grammatical expertise (τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὑτῷ 
γραμματικήν). EN 1105a22-26.3
Since Aristotle has used the analogy with skills to motivate the aporia about 
habituation, the most natural interpretation here is that he intends to extend this 
initial dissolution of the aporia by analogy to the case of moral virtues.4 The result-
ing analogical argument for the dissolution is then quite straightforward. Since one 
can do grammatical things both by chance and at someone else’s prompting, this 
shows that one can do grammatical things without oneself being already in posses-
sion of the skill of grammar. By analogy, one can do just things by chance and at 
someone else’s prompting, and so one can do just things without being already in 
possession of the virtue of justice. That respect in which moral virtue and skills are 
analogous is precisely that both skills and moral virtues are gradually acquired by 
trial and error (chance) and through the guidance of experts (at someone else’s 
prompting), by the repeated bringing about of ‘F outcomes’ or ‘things’ such as 
something γραμματικόν, or something σώφρον.
Because the mere ‘F-outcomes’ (γινόμενα) do not imply the possession of the 
corresponding F-skill or F-virtue, the initial aporia about habituation is dissolved. 
For that aporia was based on the act-sufficiency claim (i.e. to do just or moderate 
‘things’ implies that the agent carrying out these acts is already just or moderate), 
which has now been shown to be false in a sense. Surely the act-sufficiency claim is 
true with regard to a different sort of actions, such as doing something grammati-
cally (γραμματικῶς), i.e. in accordance with one’s own grammatical skill (κατὰ τὴν 
3 I will be using Bywater 1894 edition of the Ethica Nicomachea. All translations are my own, 
unless otherwise indicated.
4 This is for instance the interpretation of Grant (1885), Joachim (1951) and Taylor (2006) (see 
their commentaries ad loc.).
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ἐν αὑτῷ γραμματικήν). In general, in order for an action to imply the possession of 
the corresponding F-skill, it does not only suffice that one brings about an F thing, 
but it is also required that one does it in an F-way (e.g. grammatically), that is, (a) 
in conformity with the expertise peculiar to that F-skill (thus ruling out its being a 
mere result of chance), and (b) where the F-skill in question is possessed by the 
agent himself (thus ruling out its being done at someone else’s prompting). By the 
former analogy we are naturally encouraged to make the same claims with regard to 
moral dispositions, mutatis mutandis. Thus, Aristotle will talk of doing something 
moderately (σοφρόνως), i.e. in accordance with (one’s own) virtue (κατὰ τὴν 
ἀρετήν, 1105a29), when the action fulfils both of these conditions.
Does this mean that the identity claim was false? Clearly not. It only means that 
the identity between deeds involved in habituation and fully virtuous ones cannot 
consist in their having the same causal conditions. But then notice that Aristotle 
owes us a positive explanation of what this claim means. I shall return to this point 
when discussing the third part of the argument.
10.3  The Dissimilarity between Moral Virtue and Skills
Nonetheless, despite his having apparently solved the initial aporia about habitua-
tion, Aristotle continues, in what seems to be a digression, or so I will argue:
[T2] Further (ἔτι), the case of the skills and that of moral virtues do not even resemble each 
other: the things that come about through the agency of skills (τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα) 
contain in themselves the mark of a good condition (τὸ εὖ ἔχει ἐν αὑτοῖς), so that it is 
enough (ἀρκεῖ) if they come to be in a certain condition, whereas the things that come about 
in accordance with the moral virtues (τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα) count as done justly 
(δικαιῶς) or moderately (σωφρόνως) not merely when they themselves are in certain con-
dition, but also when the agent is in a certain condition in doing them: first, if he does them 
knowingly, secondly if he decides to do them, and decides to do them for themselves, and 
thirdly if he does them from a firm and unchanging disposition. EN 1105a26-33.
Aristotle is now pointing towards a major dissimilarity between τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν 
τεχνῶν γινόμενα (“the things that come about through the agency of skill”) and τὰ 
κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα (“the things that come about in accordance with the 
virtues”). It is natural to think that this dissimilarity somehow affects the initial dis-
solution of the aporia about habituation in T1, since that dissolution was based on 
the analogy with skills. Before determining how this dissimilarity affects the initial 
dissolution (see next section), however, an interpretation of what Aristotle means by 
“τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα” in 1105a27 is absolutely vital.
For reasons of economy, let me provisionally translate the expression ‘τὰ ὑπὸ 
τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα’ in T2 simply as ‘works of skill’. What I call the ‘Aggregative 
Reading’ takes the contrast in T2 between the goodness (τὸ εὖ) located in works of 
skill and the goodness located in the things that come about in accordance with the 
virtues, to depend on the contrast drawn in the lines immediately following T2 
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between the kind of conditions that must be fulfilled by an agent if either of these F 
things is to have some goodness:
[T3] When it is a matter of the possession (τὸ ἔχειν) of skills, these conditions do not count, 
except for knowledge itself; but when it comes to the possession of the moral virtues, 
knowledge has a small or no significance, whereas the force of the other conditions is no 
small thing but counts for everything, and these indeed result from the repeated perfor-
mance of just and moderate things. EN 1105a33-b5.
According to the Aggregative Reading, whereas the things that come about in 
accordance with the moral virtues must be carried out with knowledge, chosen on 
their own account, and issue from a firm and unchanging moral disposition, works 
of skill must be carried out only with knowledge, that is, the knowledge that defines 
the corresponding skill. Accordingly, this interpretation takes the contrast in pas-
sage T2 to be a contrast drawn among things done in an F-way. So for instance, 
J. A. Stewart comments on Aristotle’s conditions for acting from virtue in T2:
‘Unless these conditions in the agent be fulfilled, we do not speak of the moral value of 
actions: but works of art have their artistic merit independently of any such conditions in the 
artist, except of course that of his having knowledge’.5
“Works of art” is Stewart’s translation of ‘τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα’. Against 
Stewart, it can be said that when Aristotle says in T2 that knowledge is relevant for 
skills (1105b1–2), he is clearly referring to those productions that reflect the posses-
sion (τὸ ἔχειν, b1) of a skill (i.e. things done in an F-way); but nothing of what 
Aristotle says in T2 about the goodness of works of skill suggests that by “works of 
skill” (τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα) he means things done in an F-way, and which 
reflect the possession of F-skill accordingly.
Indeed, Aristotle has unequivocally been using the expression ‘X κατά F’ to 
mark the fact that X is something done in a certain way, that is, something that is 
done thanks to F and which reflects the possession of F – where F (in the accusa-
tive) is the corresponding skill or the moral virtues.6 For current purposes, it will 
suffice to note that Aristotle here uses the expression ‘X κατά F’ to indicate a sort 
of causal relationship between X and F – in particular, I should add, one in which 
some typical result, X, is caused by something F according to certain rules or stan-
dards intrinsic to F. By contrast, the use of the preposition ‘ὑπό’ plus genitive 
(‘through the agency of’) in “τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα” rather suggests that 
through the latter phrase he intends to express a slightly different relationship 
between skills and γινόμενα.
Some interpreters have indeed suggested that the two prepositions ‘ὑπό’ and 
‘κατά’ express the same relationship in our passage, namely a straightforwardly 
causal or productive relationship, but that Aristotle employs ‘ὑπό’ to indicate the 
causal relationship between a finished product and the corresponding skill, while he 
employs ‘κατά’ to indicate the causal relationship between conduct and the 
5 Stewart (1892, p. 182). Italics are mine.
6 Cf. τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὑτῷ γραμματικήν (1105a25), τά κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα (1105a28–9).
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 corresponding moral disposition.7 Against this interpretation, it must be noted that 
at 1105a25 Aristotle uses the preposition ‘κατά’ also in connection with the art of 
grammar (one of his paradigmatic skills), to indicate that something is done thanks 
to the art of grammar.8 Why then not use the same preposition κατά, instead of ὑπό 
in τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα, if he intended to express the very same causal 
relationship between some work or product and the corresponding skill? Some 
other explanation needs to be offered for Aristotle’s shift from the use of ‘κατά’ to 
the use of ‘ὑπό’ in the phrase in question. I shall suggest one below.
In the meantime, it must be noted that Sarah Broadie’s comments have an impli-
cation similar to Stewart’s:
Once chance and direction by another have been eliminated (22-23), X counts as a work of 
skill or technical expertise if it is seen to have the qualities typical of products of the exper-
tise in question. But for Y to count as a work of justice, etc. (under the same conditions) it 
is not enough that Y be seen to be the kind of thing the just person would do: certain condi-
tions must also be seen to hold of the agent of Y.9
Broadie’s view is clearly supported by her (and Rowe’s) reading of τὸ εὖ ἔχει ἐν 
αὑτοῖς (1105a27) as ‘the mark of their being done well’.10 This adverbial reading 
misleadingly suggests that, once more, by ‘works of skill’ (i.e. τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν 
γινόμενα) Aristotle is referring to things done in an F-way (e.g. grammatically or 
musically). Nonetheless, if we translate the expression τὸ εὖ ἔχει ἐν αὑτοῖς as ‘con-
tain in themselves the mark of a good condition’,11 then this interpretation is not so 
obvious. If by ‘a work of skill’ it is meant τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα at 1105a27, 
then it is not at all obvious, for all Aristotle says in T2, that in order for X to be 
counted as a work of skill, one needs to eliminate chance and direction by another, 
as Broadie suggests: for all Aristotle has said in T2, even if X is an accidental out-
come, X can still be said to be a good ‘work of skill’ (e.g. a well formed sentence, a 
clean victory, etc.).
Now, that this is indeed the case is confirmed by several texts where Aristotle 
claims that works of skill, such as a well-formed sentence or a house, can be gener-
ated by chance (ἀπὸ τύχης). He claims that products can come about ‘by spontane-
ity and chance’ (Metaph. 1032a29), and he makes the same claim with regard to 
specific works of skill, such as health (Metaph. 1049a18) and the effects of tragedy 
(Po. 1454a11). Actually, it is his considered view in the Nicomachean Ethics that ‘in 
7 John Burnet, for instance, suggests that the prepositions ὑπό and κατά ‘correspond to the distinc-
tion between ποιεῖν and πράττειν, ἔργον and πρᾶξις’ respectively (Burnet (1900, p. 87)). The same 
interpretation is advanced by Gauthier and Jolif (1970, p. 130).
8 The phrase with ὑπό is not necessarily Aristotle’s stock phrase to refer to artifacts. Whereas he 
sometimes uses this phrase (e.g. EN 1175a24), he also uses the phrase with κατά in other places 
(e.g. Ph. 193a32).
9 Broadie and Rowe (2002, p. 300). Italics are my own. For similar interpretations, see also Tricot 
(1959, p. 98), Annas (1993, p. 68), and more recently Jimenez (2016, p. 16).
10 Broadie and Rowe (2002, translation ad loc.).
11 Or ‘have their goodness in themselves’ (Ross) or ‘ont leur valeur en elles-mêmes’ (Tricot). In the 
Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle tends to use τὸ εὖ and τὸ ἀγαθόν interchangeably (e.g. EN 1097b27).
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a way chance and skill are concerned with the same objects’ (EN 1140a18), in the 
sense that both chance and skills can be causally responsible of bringing about the 
same objects.
As a result, the Aggregative Reading obscures the significance of the contrast 
between virtues and skills that Aristotle is drawing upon in T2. Perhaps the preposi-
tion ὑπό in τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα misleads us into thinking of things that 
actually come about through the agency of a skill, but the phrase is to be understood 
as referring to a class of entities such as ‘grammatical things’ and ‘musical things’ 
(F-things) that, as we have seen, can be the result of both (i) expert direction by 
another and (ii) chance. Accordingly, Aristotle cannot be referring with this phrase 
to things that actually come about as a result of the exercise of a skill.
So, what does the phrase mean? Perhaps our phrase stands for those things that 
characteristically come about through the agency of a skill. Unfortunately, there are 
certain end-conditions, such as health, of which it would be misleading to say that 
they come about ‘characteristically’ as a result of e.g. the exercise of medicine. 
Health is most characteristically the result of non-artificial factors, such as natural 
weight loss or natural evacuation (cf. Metaph. 1013b1). So perhaps the best alterna-
tive is to understand the phrase in this context as ‘things that can come about through 
the agency of skill’. I am not saying that this is what the phrase means. The point I 
am making is about how to understand the ‘extension’ of the phrase, so to say; to 
wit, the class of entities of which the phrase is truly predicated, which is much larger 
than the class of entities that are the actual products of the exercise of a skill. For the 
sake of brevity, I will simply use the term ‘artifacts’ to refer to this larger class of 
entities.
Now, if I am right, the contrast in passage T2 between virtues and skills is indeed 
much sharper than what the Aggregative Reading suggests. If τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν 
γινόμενα is effectively being used to refer to artifacts, Aristotle would be saying 
that, even when they are the result of chance artifacts contain in themselves the cri-
terion of their goodness. Now this idea is quite fascinating and probably true. 
Suppose we discover that, by an extraordinary coincidence, an ape typed an English 
sentence with no grammatical faults. Aristotle would be saying that such a sentence 
can still be judged good by grammatical standards, provided that it is spelled accord-
ing to the rules of English grammar; its ‘condition’ is then to be judged good inde-
pendently of the way in which it was produced (i.e. whether or not according to the 
art of grammar in the full sense).
This is an important feature of artifacts (in the broad sense previously specified), 
and one that contrasts neatly with actions. Buildings fit for habitation, military vic-
tories, well-constructed sentences or symphonies, can all be unconditionally good 
in the sense that they can be regarded as being what they ought to be or as function-
ing in the way they ought to function regardless of whether they are the actual 
products of the proficient exercise of a τέχνη. The consequence is that from a well- 
formed sentence I can infer that someone was in possession of grammatical knowl-
edge, provided that I make sure that (i) he was in fact the one who wrote the sentence 
and that (ii) he wrote the sentence in accordance with his own grammatical 
 knowledge. That is, contrary to what the Aggregative Reading suggests, I do not 
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have to first establish (i) and (ii) in order to know that such a sentence is 
well-formed.
I have suggested that this contrast between skills and excellent ethical disposi-
tions is spelled out in terms of their corresponding ‘works’ or ‘operations’ (ἔργα): 
what can be the final product of an activity of technical production (the house, the 
victory, etc.), or an ethically significant piece of conduct (πρᾶξις) in the case of 
moral dispositions (cf. EE 1219a14–18). Skills, however, have yet another ‘opera-
tion’, namely, the activity of production itself, the ποίησις. Now, it is possible that 
by τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα Aristotle also refers to the process of production, 
and not only the final product. After all, the activity of production is something that 
occurs in virtue of the agency of a skill. If you saw an ape typing at random you 
wouldn’t say that it was writing something. Nevertheless, wouldn’t this present a 
problem for my non-aggregative interpretation of T2, given that – one may think – 
the process of production itself cannot come about by chance?
The answer is ‘No’. When Aristotle explicitly refers to the activity of production, 
by saying that ‘it is possible to produce (ποιῆσαι) something grammatical both by 
chance and at someone else’s prompting’ (1105a22–23), it is evident that he does 
not take ‘to produce’ to mean the actual exercise of τέχνη. As a matter of fact, if 
what I have argued is correct, it is perfectly reasonable for processes of production 
to be interpreted as ‘artifacts’, at least whenever the question concerning their good-
ness is at stake. If a given artifact can be deemed good independently of its being the 
product of the exercise of a skill, then any process whatsoever – whether identical 
to such exercise or not – can be deemed good in so far as it brings about such an 
artifact. According to this view that I am now attributing (somehow tentatively) to 
Aristotle, the only consideration relevant to the increasing or decreasing goodness 
of a given process of production is its being more or less reliable in bringing about 
the artifact, which has already been established as ‘good’, indeed as good as it can 
be (see below), on independent grounds. If a skill happens in turn to be good at all, 
we might now suppose, this is only due to its being the source of a reliable processes 
of production of a good artifact.
To be more faithful to Aristotle’s own way of expressing this contrast in T2, we 
could say that, according to him, whenever we judge an artefact to be good in this 
extrinsic fashion, this is enough (ἀρκεῖ, a28), that is, we have ‘all that we want’ in 
terms of ‘technical goodness’, so to speak. But this is not the case with moral 
agency, for whereas judging the condition of an artifact as technically good in this 
extrinsic fashion is enough, the condition of a piece of morally significant conduct 
or ‘outcome’ judged in this extrinsic fashion is not enough, that is, it does not give 
us all that we want in terms of moral goodness. We only have all that we want in this 
latter sphere when the action is done in a certain way, that is to say, when the moral 
agent as such is fully responsible for it. This is then the dissimilarity between moral 
dispositions and skills that Aristotle has in mind in T2.
In sum, the contrast in T2 between the goodness of artifacts and morally signifi-
cant behavior is not based, as the Aggregative Reading suggests, on the difference 
between the sort of conditions internal to the producer in the one case, and the ones 
internal to the moral agent in the other  – conditions that artifacts and morally 
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 significant actions have to meet in order to count as fully good. Rather, the differ-
ence in question is grounded on the fact that, whereas such inward conditions are 
irrelevant to the true goodness of an artifact, they are of the utmost importance to the 
true or full goodness of a morally significant deed.
I am conscious that a result of my interpretation is that Aristotle is left with the 
uncomfortable notion of a virtuous ‘outcome’ or ‘deed’ (‘the moral outcome’) that 
can be identified as such, that is as just, moderate, etc., quite independently of its 
being the result of virtuous agency at all (in particular, even in cases where knowl-
edge of the action as just, moderate, etc. is not available to its agent). For instance, 
if I gave the money back to the person I owed it to thinking that the envelope con-
tains a love-letter, Aristotle would have to say that such a deed was a just thing. This 
would be the equivalent of the ape typing a well-formed English sentence. I will 
address this problem below, but for the moment let it suffice to point out that this 
agency-independent notion is certainly present in Aristotle’s Ethics.
10.4  The Second Dissolution of the Aporia
How is the second section of Aristotle’s argument, T2, logically connected with the 
previous aporia about habituation and its initial dissolution in T1? More precisely, 
the difficulty consists in understanding how the evaluative dissimilarity between 
skills and moral virtue noted in T2 bears upon the aporia about habituation and its 
initial dissolution in T1 based on the analogical argument.
Firstly, as we have seen, Aristotle states the initial aporia about habituation. He 
says this aporia doesn’t hold for skills because the act-sufficiency claim is here 
false; and because in one respect skills and moral virtue are analogous, the analogy 
helps him make the case for claiming that the act-sufficiency claim doesn’t hold for 
moral virtue either. Nonetheless, now in T2 Aristotle is not satisfied with that solu-
tion. He now concedes that there is a difference between the domain of skills and the 
domain of virtue, the difference being that something inward is necessary for our 
being completely satisfied with the goodness of virtuous action, namely, some inter-
nal conditions of the moral agent. None of the parallel conditions linking the pro-
ducer with the artifact – not even knowledge – is required for our being completely 
satisfied with the goodness of artifacts.
Now, had we liken moral virtue to skills, as the initial analogical argument did, 
but disregarded the disanalogy just indicated, we would have been led to believe the 
wrong thing. We would have been led to believe that just like a well-formed sen-
tence is in as good a condition as it can get, so too when I give the money back to 
the person I owed it to thinking that the envelope contains a love-letter, this just 
outcome (that the creditor got his money back, justice was served) is as good as it 
can get – and perhaps the only value and significance of moral virtue would now lie 
in its being a reliable producer of good outcomes. That is, we would have ended 
attributing to Aristotle a form of consequentialism. If, on the other hand, we do not 
disregard the evaluative disanalogy, there is a clear respect in which the analogy 
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with skills is misleading, because it suggests that just as in artifacts we get all we 
want when the artifact is in a certain condition extrinsically, so with ‘just things’ or 
‘moderate things’ we get all we want (from human agents qua human) when the 
same holds. Doing these deeds justly or moderately would not add any value to the 
action: it would merely allow us to infer from it the possession of moral character 
by the agent, as in the case of doing something skillfully. And the analogy on its own 
misleadingly suggests this picture of moral agency, I believe, because: (i) it forces 
us to make sense of a just or moderate outcome that is independent of the inward 
conditions of moral agency and yet identical to the action issuing from such condi-
tions; and (ii) the obvious and natural way of making sense of this sort of outcomes 
is to think that there is some extrinsic criterion of goodness, independent of the 
inward conditions of moral agency, that applies to them.12
And now my interpretation, which involves two claims. (I) First, as a result of 
this evaluative disanalogy, the initial analogy between virtue and skills that served 
Aristotle well in the initial response to the aporia is misleading, as we have seen. So 
clearly, when Aristotle says ‘Further (ἔτι), the case of the skills and that of moral 
virtues do not even resemble each other’ (1105a25–6), at the beginning of T2, this 
emphatically does not contribute to the initial dissolution of the aporia based on the 
skill-analogy. Logically at the very least the point introduced here seems to be a 
digression to the previous argument.
I am conscious that perhaps the trouble with taking it like this is grammatical: it 
is now not clear how to make sense of the adverb ἔτι (1105a25), which clearly isn’t 
in the right position to mean anything other than: ‘Another point’ – as opposed to 
discharging a digressive function. Perhaps because the adverb ἔτι is most naturally 
taken, grammatically speaking, as adding to the immediately previous dissolution 
of the aporia, most commentators have tried to interpret T2 precisely as an addition 
to or a way of strengthening the initial analogical dissolution. It is not at all clear, 
however, how the evaluative disanalogy between virtue and skills here introduced 
could be an addition to the initial analogical dissolution.13 Surely, because of this 
12 In fact, there are reasons to think with Arthur Adkins that the traditional conception of ἀρετή 
reinforced this natural suggestion. Adkins argues that such a conception, ‘from Homer onwards, 
always commended the correct reaction, or the production of the correct result, in a given situation, 
regardless of the manner in which the result was produced or the intentions of the agent’, adding 
that ‘the explicit linking of εὐδαιμονία and ἀρετή merely emphasised this’ (1963, p. 332). Adkins 
himself suggests that the first in the history of philosophy to remove this ‘chief impediment’ was 
in fact Aristotle (p. 334), by insisting that any action performed from ἀρετή must satisfy certain 
conditions internal to the agent. I think Adkins was right.
13 The clearest interpretation along these lines is Alexander Grant’s (1885, commentary ad loc.). 
His view is that T2 helps to solve the aporia about habituation by somehow reinforcing the ana-
logical argument initially offered by Aristotle to dissolve it. For the point of this analogical argu-
ment was to show that if we have reason to suppose that mere getting F-things done is not proof of 
the possession of skill, then we have reason to suppose that it is no proof of the possession of moral 
virtue either. If Aristotle’s second argument now in T2 consists in arguing that, whereas an artifact 
can be judged as being good by its intrinsic properties, mere doing of ‘just things’ or ‘moderate 
things’ cannot be so judged, it follows that it is even more evident that in the case of moral virtues 
the mere doings of these things do not imply the possession of a just or moderate character by the 
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difficulty, most interpreters, wanting to follow the natural reading of ἔτι, simply 
choose to disregard the evaluative disanalogy, as I have interpreted it in the previous 
section. The usual reading is once more based on the Aggregative Reading.14
(II) What I want to suggest is that there is a second alternative: the ἔτι sentence 
does indeed introduce a further reason, but not for strengthening or adding to the 
analogical argument – rather, a reason for directly dissolving the aporia, a reason 
that is directly based on the evaluative disanalogy. The crucial point, I think, is to 
realise what is involved in Aristotle’s concession that it is not the case (as the initial 
analogy might have suggested) that just as in artifacts we get all we want when the 
artifact is in a certain extrinsic condition, so with the possible outcomes of agency 
we get all we want when they can be extrinsically labeled as ‘just’ or ‘moderate’. 
The crucial point is that this concession only makes sense if there is already in play 
an underlying distinction between merely doing e.g. just deeds, on the one hand, 
and just deeds done justly (i.e. from a just character). We attribute all the goodness 
we want only to the latter, whereas the former (the mere outcomes) fail to give us all 
we want. Accordingly, by making this important concession, Aristotle can also 
derive the gist of his solution to the aporia, according to which there can be just 
deeds without yet being an agent in full possession of justice. This conceded dis-
analogy too helps Aristotle make the main case, and thus the initial aporia can once 
more be dismissed.
Accordingly, it seems to me that Aristotle’s argument thus far has something of 
the form of ‘p implies q, not-p implies q: therefore q’. That is to say: ‘the analogy 
gives me the desired point, the disanalogy gives me the desired point: therefore, I 
am entitled to the desired point.’ This may give the false impression that Aristotle is 
agent: for how could they have such implication if, strictly speaking, these ‘things’ are not even 
moderate or just? I find Grant’s interpretation unconvincing. Aristotle evidently thinks that merely 
getting just things done is no proof of the possession of justice, not because it cannot be character-
ised as ‘moderate’, ‘just’, etc., but rather because, although it can be so characterised, there are (as 
he claims in T3) further conditions internal to the agent performing these actions that need to be 
fulfilled in order for the agent to count as just or moderate.
14 See for instance Hutchinson (1986, pp. 90–91); Irwin (1999, p. 195); Taylor (2006, p. 83). These 
scholars ssuppose that in order for something to count as having ‘artistic merit’ you needed the 
knowledge condition. Hence, on this interpretation, you need the knowledge condition in order for 
something to count as a just or moderate deed too. It is now supposed that Aristotle’s point in T2 
is merely to point out that in order for these deeds to count as done justly or moderately and thus 
to imply the possession of character you need further inward conditions besides the knowledge 
condition. This contributes to the initial analogical argument simply because the distinction 
between the knowledge condition and such further inward conditions (acting from rational choice 
and full possession of character) is perfectly adequate to account for the distinction between ‘the 
just, etc. deed’ and ‘the just, etc. deed done justly’. The just deed is done with the relevant knowl-
edge, and is the one involved in habituation; the just deed done justly requires further inward 
conditions and it is the one arising from virtuous character. It should be clear by now that I reject 
this reading. The knowledge condition is not needed in order for something to count as a just or 
moderate deed or outcome. Moreover, this reading flagrantly ignores the significance of the evalu-
ative disanalogy, and also misinterprets the initial distinction between (i) artifacts and (ii) bringing 
them about in a skillful way that is the basis of the analogy – what can now be the basis of this 
distinction, if the knowledge condition applies equally to both?
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merely interested in the result (q), but I also think he wants to maintain both p and 
not-p, that is, both the initial analogy and the disanalogy. There is in fact the obvious 
parallel between artifacts and moral ‘F-outcomes’ on the one hand: because they 
do not imply the possession of the F-skill or F-moral character, they can be involved 
in the relevant processes of learning and habituation. Nonetheless, by contrast with 
artifacts, mere outcomes or deeds fail to give us all we want in the moral domain, 
and we only get this when such deeds are the exercise of moral agency. As I have 
tried to argue, this new disanalogy is important in its own right, but it also helps to 
dissolve the aporia – without contradicting the first analogy, strictly speaking.
Now, because Aristotle takes our fundamental disanalogy seriously, and because 
conceding this disanalogy presupposes a distinction between merely doing e.g. just 
deeds and just deeds done justly, I think that Aristotle’s three inward conditions for 
acting virtuously (in T2) should now be regarded in a light different to the usual 
‘aggregative’ one. Suppose the action I did yesterday at the party can be appropri-
ately described as ‘refusing to eat an enormous chocolate cake’. Firstly, for the 
action to be done temperately, it must be carried out by myself in full knowledge 
that what I am refusing is merely to eat an enormous cake, and not for example, a 
poisoned cake; for otherwise my action would not be a recognisably temperate 
action (this is the knowledge condition). Secondly, my action must be the result of 
προαίρεσις, a considered judgement to the effect that refusing to eat an enormous 
cake is, overall, good conduct, and moreover, good conduct qua refusing to eat it, as 
opposed, for example, to qua pleasing my girlfriend by so acting. It is easy to see 
that my action would not be a recognisably temperate action if this condition were 
not fulfilled (this is the προαίρεσις condition). And thirdly, Aristotle also believes 
that, for the action to be fully good, it must be carried out from a firm and unchang-
ing temperate disposition, that is to say, a firm and unchanging disposition to act in 
this way whenever it is required (call this the ‘stability condition’).
Once we have noticed the evaluative disanalogy and decided to integrate it to the 
whole argument, these inward conditions of acting from virtue acquire a whole new 
significance: they become conditions for the goodness of a given deed, not (merely), 
as in the parallel case inspired by skillful activity, for inferring the presence of moral 
character in the agent. I suspect that the implicit message that Aristotle now wants 
to convey is that the deed is better the more it is the result of moral agency according 
to the stipulated inward conditions.
Somehow incidentally, let me notice that it is not difficult to see why someone 
could think, on the basis of these inward conditions, that moral virtues are good 
merely due to their being reliably or ‘non-accidentally’ productive of ‘moral out-
comes’. Someone who fulfils these conditions is much more likely to act e.g. tem-
perately when the occasion arises, than someone who does not fulfil them. Take for 
instance the voluntariness condition. If you were forced to refrain from eating the 
cake, even if such refusal happens to be the right thing to do in the circumstances, 
there is no guarantee that you would have willingly refused to eat in the absence of 
any constraining factors (in fact, quite the opposite). Again, take the προαίρεσις 
condition. Aristotle himself recognises that if you pursue or choose A for the sake 
of Z, then, strictly speaking, you pursue or choose Z, not A: you pursue or choose A 
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only accidentally (EN 1151a35-b2). So even if A (e.g. refusing to eat the cake) hap-
pens to be the right action, there is no guarantee that you would still have done A if 
A had not been instrumentally connected with Z (e.g. pleasing your girlfriend). This 
does not occur to someone who chooses A for its own sake. Finally, take the stability 
condition. Even if you chose to refrain from eating the cake in full knowledge of the 
relevant facts and for its own sake, you are clearly not a reliably producer of ‘tem-
perate outcomes’ if such choice is not deeply ingrained in your character: it may 
well be the case that this is the only right choice you have made and will ever make 
in your life. Accordingly, there is some attractiveness to the skill-based or conse-
quentialist interpretation of the nobility we attribute to acting from virtue.
Now clearly, if you have the Aggregative Reading, you might fail to see that 
Aristotle is emphatically rejecting this picture of moral agency in our chapter. If we 
are to take seriously the evaluative disanalogy introduced by T2, Aristotle is clearly 
implying that these inward conditions of moral agency give us all that we want in 
terms of the action’s goodness. This in turn implies that the conditions in question 
are what constitutes this goodness, at least partially: if the action extrinsically 
described had not issued in accordance with these conditions, it would have been 
less good, or perhaps not good at all. Therefore, the goodness of moral virtue must 
be partly intrinsic and cannot fully derive from its reliability to produce ‘moral out-
comes’ independently established as fully good, for no ‘moral outcome’ can be 
established as fully good in the first place. This is an important result in its own 
right.
10.5  Such as the Just or Moderate Person would Do Them
The final, logically independent claim, developed in T3, is that these further internal 
conditions for acting from moral virtue come about (at least partly) through the 
repeated performance of the relevant deeds. Let me now quote the full passage:
[T3] And when it is a matter of the possession (τὸ ἔχειν) of skills, these conditions do not 
count, except for knowledge itself; but when it comes to the possession of the moral virtues, 
knowledge has a small or no significance, whereas the force of the other conditions is no 
small thing but counts for everything, and these indeed result from the repeated perfor-
mance of just and moderate things. So things done are called just and moderate (πράγματα 
δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα λέγεται) whenever they are such that the just person or the moderate 
person would do them; whereas a person is not just and moderate because he does these 
things, but also because he does them in the way in which just and moderate people do them 
[i.e. according to the conditions just described]. Therefore, it is right to say that one comes 
to be a just person from doing just things and moderate from doing moderate things. EN 
1105a33-b10.
The claim that full possession of moral virtue comes about through the repeated 
performance of the relevant deeds is not new, of course: it is the habituation claim. 
What the previous arguments have shown is that it is now possible to make such a 
claim without any trace of paradox, because we have now been forced (because of 
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the evaluative disanalogy) to identify a class of deeds that are ‘morally significant’ 
but do not already imply the possession of character. According to my interpreta-
tion, Aristotle’s argument has subtly shown that this class of deeds can fulfill 
increasingly demanding and robust conditions leading to full possession of charac-
ter but not yet entailing it: there is a sense in which they can be the outcome of 
chance, or they can be brought about with the relevant knowledge but someone 
else’s knowledge (as in instruction), or they can be brought about with the agent’s 
own knowledge, and perhaps they can even be prompted by the deliberated choice 
of the instructor. At least in principle all these deeds can now serve to habituate the 
agent by means of their repeated performance.
But now notice that Aristotle needs to make sense of our ability to identify these 
deeds as ‘just things’ or ‘moderate things’ in the first place (recall the awkwardness 
noted before). Furthermore, he has also incurred a related explanatory debt: how to 
make sense of the identity claim, given that deeds involved in moral habituation do 
not have the same causal conditions as the ones manifested by full possession of 
character, nor the same value. Aristotle’s final position is spelt out at 1105b5–9, and 
it is partly meant, I think, to dispel these doubts. Deeds are called (λέγεται) just, etc. 
when they are deeds such as just people do; whereas the just person is (ἐστίν) not 
merely one who does just deeds but one who does them on the basis of the stated 
inward conditions. If I gave the money back to the person I owed it to thinking that 
the envelope contains a love-letter, Aristotle can now say that such a deed can at 
least be called ‘just’, presumably because it can be recognised by a virtuous agent 
as the sort of thing that he would perform voluntarily and from character if he was 
in my shoes. The recognition of a deed by the virtuous agent as the sort of thing he 
would do from character provides us with the relevant identification, and also pro-
vides the identity claim with the right content: all F-deeds, whether involved in the 
process of habituation or fully manifesting virtue, have this recognition as a com-
mon denominator.
Somehow incidentally, notice that perhaps the contrast between calling deeds 
‘just’ or ‘moderate’ and agents being just or moderate, is meant to convey the idea 
that the former are not in reality good. If this is the case, the evaluative dissimilarity 
between virtue and skills is even more profound than I have suggested, for it would 
entail that any deed or outcome that is independent of the conditions of moral 
agency, instead of merely failing to give us all we want in terms of moral worth, 
gives us nothing in these terms. Furthermore, if this were the case, the conditions of 
moral agency would not only ‘contribute’ to the moral goodness of a given deed or 
outcome: they would fully determine such goodness. It seems to me that Aristotle’s 
contrast between calling deeds ‘just’, ‘moderate’, etc., and the agent’s being just, 
moderate, etc., might well suggest this more profound dissimilarity.
Another relevant point is that Aristotle’s argument must be supplemented as fol-
lows. According to my interpretation of Nicomachean Ethics II 4, deeds or out-
comes that are the mere result of chance and those that are the result of instruction 
fall under the same category: mere F outcomes. Aristotle’s point here in this chapter 
is certainly that deeds performed as a result of instruction do not reflect the posses-
sion of skill or character by the tutee, but rather the one by the tutor. Still, these 
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actions are typically voluntary, whereas practical outcomes or artifacts that result 
from chance are not voluntary. Nicomachean Ethics II 4, however, must implicitly 
distinguish between the voluntary, morally significant actions performed under the 
direction of a tutor, and those states of affairs that are the outcome of chance, 
because part of the Nicomachean Ethics II 4 argument is that the most important of 
the conditions for acting from virtue (i.e. being able to act from rational choice and 
a stable character) come about through the frequent doing of ‘just things’ or, ‘mod-
erate things’, and these frequent doings clearly do not include outcomes that are the 
result of chance.
There is nonetheless a solution to this problem. The Nicomachean Ethics II 4 
implicit distinction between voluntary actions and involuntary deeds, is explicitly 
drawn by Nicomachean Ethics V (1135a19–23),15 where Aristotle distinguishes 
between doing an unjust act (ἀδίκημα) which is voluntary by definition, and doing 
something unjust (τι ἄδικον), which is not voluntary. In order to solve the aporia 
about becoming a virtuous agent, it was enough for Aristotle to show that one could 
do ‘just things’ or ‘moderate things’ without being in possession of just or moderate 
character. But the implicit distinction between doing an unjust act and doing some-
thing unjust is important because, in the process of acquiring an unjust character 
through habituation, the would-be moral agent is required to perform unjust acts 
voluntarily16 in such a way that this performance is neither governed by chance (as 
in the doing of something unjust) nor implies that he is already in possession of an 
unjust character (as in doing something unjust in a certain way).
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